Resisting the Lure of Certainty, Seeking the Unity of Truth: A Nineteenth-Century Voice with Twenty-first-Century Resonance by Patton, Elizabeth
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Boston Theological Institute Journal of Faith and Science Exchange
2012-08-21
Resisting the Lure of Certainty,
Seeking the Unity of Truth: A
Nineteenth-Century Voice with
Twenty-first-Century Resonance
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/4012
Boston University
Resisting the Lure of Certainty, Seeking the Unity of Truth:
A Nineteenth-Century Voice with Twenty-hrst-Century Resonance
Elizabeth Patton
New Hall
Tlie University of Cambridge
In her essay, the author seeks to bring the vision ofnineteenth-century American philoso-
pher Charles Sanders Peirce to the attention of those involved in the contemporary debate
over the relationship benx'een religion and science. Peirce's conception ofa "scientific reli-
gion " and the openness ofa scientific integrated with the human experience ofthe divine as a
way ofovercoming the equating of truth with rigid certainty is ofparticular relevance today,
when the dangers offundamentalist biblical interpretation are especially evident.
Introduction
A recent article in the Financial Tunes, a
major international newspaper, carried the
headline "Religious repression— western
style." In describing the debate over embry-
onic stem-cell research, the author Thomas
Barlow lamented the tendency of many in the
"secular" west "to impede the use of embryos
for research into regenerative medicine." based
"largely on parochial religious grounds." ' One
can imagine the nineteenth-century American
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-
1914) shaking his head. Such an article sug-
gests that opposing conceptions of what con-
stitutes truth continue to drive a wedge between
religion and science, nearly one hundred years
after he passionately argued for a unified reli-
gion and science to overcome the human ten-
dency to define truth in terms of narrow cer-
tainties. Peirce saw the method of science as
enabling the pursuit of truth in its broadest and
fullest sense, by emphasizing the openness to
new ideas that was its leading characteristic.
Although he is a nineteenth-century
thinker, Peirce's ideas on the relationship be-
tween science and religion and the danger
posed by the lure of certainty to the search
for knowledge are strikingly relevant oday.
whereas the work of many of his contempo-
raries retains only historical interest. In con-
trast to Andrew Dickson White, who lauded
the triumph of science over theology, which
he considered to be backward and conserva-
tive, and to William James, whose psycho-
logical approach relegated religion wholly to
the sphere of individual experience, Peirce
approached the problem of the relation of sci-
ence and religion from a philosophical and
logical standpoint. Peirce concluded that a
specific type of fundamentalism, that which
is characterized by the prioritizing of certainty
over all other measures of truth, was the cause
of all intellectual stagnation. In seeking to
understand why the rigid conservatism of this
kind of fundamentalism was attractive, and
what it was that made religion particularly
prone to it, Peirce devoted considerable time
and thought to the examination of the basic
nature of belief and doubt and why individu-
als preferred certainty of belief to all other
considerations. Using this basic philosophic
examination as a foundation, he drew also on
his experience as an experimental scientist
to find a way by which the subjective nature
of religious conviction might be integrated
with the rational thought processes of science.
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In this essay I will analyze Peirce's writ-
ings on the relationship between religion and
science to draw out the major elements of
his vision for the integration of the two. In
doing so, I will mainly focus on Peirce's own
work, but will also make occasional refer-
ence to White's and James's ideas as a way
of contrasting Peirce with other contempo-
rary thinkers who were also working on the
problem. I begin with a brief overview of
Peirce's background, and then move on to
an analysis of how he drew on his essays on
belief and doubt as the foundation for his later
work on the relationship between religion and
science and his arguments for the reality of
God. In providing an in-depth look at
Peirce's vision of "scientific religion," I hope
to show that his ideas, although a century old.
Peirce recognized that religion is notjust
an outmodedform ofphilosophical belief
that had given way to the intellectual
progress ofscience. Religion is some-
thingfor which no purely rational system,
not even the most spirited sciencey can
serve as a substitute or replacement.
provide a valuable and relevant intellectual
approach to today's discussions about how
religion and science might join together in the
pursuit of truth.
Charles Sanders Peirce in Context
Charles Sanders Peirce was bom in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, on 10 September 1839
and was exposed to an intellectually stimu-
lating enviroimtient from his birth. His father
was Benjamin Peirce, professor of mathemat-
ics at Harvard and well known in America
and Europe for his mathematical work;
Boston's leading intellectuals frequented the
Peirce home in Cambridge.- Peirce was a pre-
cocious child, a trait no doubt enhanced by
his father's specially devised program of stud-
ies designed to cultivate his natural "genius;"
but his formal academic career was undistin-
guished with the exception of his chemistry
degree, which was the first snmma cum laiide
degree ever awarded by the newly established
Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard Uni-
versity. His scientific work at the United
States Coastal and Geodetic Survey provided
his most steady employment throughout his
life; unlike many other American thinkers
with whom he was contemporary, Peirce
seemed unable to hold down a university po-
sition.^ The reasons for this inability are not
entirely clear, although the unconventional-
ity of his ideas and his indiscreet social be-
havior were probably factors." The non-con-
formity of his personality was compounded
by his well-documented erratic temperament
and behavior, largely the result of the peri-
odically disabling condition of facial neural-
m gia, the excruciating
pain of which he relied
on opium and later
morphine and cocaine
to relieve.^ Yet Peirce's
lack of professional
success did not stop
him from becoming
well versed in, and
writing extensively on,
a wide variety of sub-
jects including logic,
mathematics, the
physical sciences, metaphysics, and religion
and philosophy.
Peirce's early interest in how belief came
to be established is evident in his essays on
logic of science published in Popular Science
Monthly in 1878; but he gave new prominence
to his understanding of the relationship of re-
ligion to science somewhat later, beginning
in 1893 with his essay, "The Marriage of Re-
ligion and Science," and his vision for the in-
tegration of subjective religious experience
and rational analysis in the 1908 piece, "A
Neglected Argiunent for the Reality of God."
The links between the early logical work and
his later writing on "scientific religion" are
unmistakable, as Peirce's own annotations and
revisions demonstrate. Yet this side of Peirce's
work could be called his own "neglected ar-
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gument." Rarely, it seems, are his ideas on
religion and science taken as a serious com-
ponent of his philosophical vision. It is not
uncommon in scholarship about Peirce to see
his writings on science and religion described
as being the work of a "second Peirce," a
seemingly different thinker than the one who
wrote extensively on logic, mathematics, and
philosophy.* Even the editors of his collected
papers, philosophers Charles Hartshome and
Paul Weiss, in their introduction to volume 6
of the series, remark:
The second book of the volume,
devoted to religion or "psychical
metaphysics," has rather tenuous
connections with the rest of the system,
offering, apart from scattered flashes of
insight, views which have a sociologi-
cal or biographical, rather than a
fundamental systemic interest.^
These views of Peirce's writings on science
and religion obscure or sever entirely the con-
nections that Peirce himself saw between this
topic and his other writings. Peirce envisioned
his philosophical system as describing the
unity of all truth, including that of science and
religion.
The Marriage of Religion and
Science
According to Peirce's generalizations in
his essay, "The Marriage of Religion and Sci-
ence," science and religion had evolved in
ways that made them naturally antagonistic.
Science is essentially open and forward-look-
ing, while religion remains cautious and con-
servative. In the presentation of his argimient
for a "scientific religion," Peirce first exam-
ined science as the source of religion's rein-
vigoration. The essence of science is "the
scientific spirit, which is determined not to
rest satisfied with existing opinions but to
press on to the real truth of nature." The spirit
of science for Peirce is not primarily tied up
with the production of what might be called
scientific results or knowledge. Knowledge
might be no more than "a dead memory; while
by science we all habittially mean a living and
growing body of truth." ^ Science is, rather,
an openness, even a desire to have one's ideas
and beliefs continually disproved in the hope
that such reforming of belief was little by little
bringing humanity closer to true knowledge.
Peirce's vision of the spirit of science was an
optimistic one. He thought that this unified
truth toward which science was continually
approaching but never fully reaching was ac-
cessible, if investigation could be carried to
its fullest extent, something that conceivably
could take an unlimited amount of time. In
an annotation made in 1893 to his 1878 es-
say, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," he
wrote:
fW]e are all putting our shoulders to the
wheel for an end that none of us can
catch more than a glimpse at— that
which the generations are working out.
But we can see that the development of
embodied ideas is what it will consist
in.^
New truths are not just theoretical— they are
ideas that are embodied, entailing new ways
of behaving. On the subject of progress in
religion, however, he wrote:
Religion, from the nature of things,
refuses to go through her successive
transformations with sufficient celerity
to keep always in accord with the
convictions of scientific philosophy. '°
The Christian religion is often inherently con-
servative, he observed, afraid to accept new
innovations in science or other fields. Peirce
thought that religion's greatest flaw is that it
puts seciuity and certainty before the desire
for seeking true belief. In embracing its in-
herent conservatism, Christianity had become
preoccupied with constructing defensive
structures of creeds and dogmas against not
only external threats from science and phi-
losophy but also internal divisions between
groups with differing viewpoints. But this
view was not Peirce's only conception of re-
ligion. Unlike his contemporary Andrew
Dickson White, author of A History of the
Warfare of Science with Theology in
Christendom and a founder and first president
of non-sectarian Cornell University, Peirce did
not believe that the entrenched conservatism
of religion necessitates its complete subordi-
nation to scientific systems of knowledge.
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White saw the "conquest" of religion by sci-
ence reducing religion to a mere evolution-
ary step in the upward ascent to truth of which
science was the leading edge.
Modem science, in substituting a new
heaven and a new earth for the old— the
reign of law for the reign of caprice,
and the idea of evolution for that of
creation— has added and is steadily
adding a new revelation divinely
inspired."
In contrast, Peirce recognized that religion is
not just an outmoded form of philosophical
belief that had given way to the intellectual
progress of science. Religion is something
for which no purely rational system, not even
the most spirited science, can serve as a sub-
stitute or replacement. He wrote:
Religion is a life [and] can be identified
with a belief only provided that belief
be a living belief— a thing to be lived
rather than said or thought.'^
Religion is a thing to be lived rather than
said or thought, because unlike philosophy or
science it was predicated on a direct intuition
of God's reality.
rWJhen a man has that experience with
which religion sets out, he has as good
reason— putting aside metaphysical
subilties [^/c]— to believe in the living
personality of God as he has to believe
in his own. Indeed, belief is a word
inappropriate to such direct percep-
tion.'^
Religion had not only fallen behind the
progress of science, but it had also become
divorced from its own source: experience.
Peirce, like his contemporaries John Draper
and White, saw the theological side of reli-
gion as the greatest restriction on its vitality."'
Yet, unlike the others, he did not see the solu-
tion in condemning the Church as a whole.
The key problem Peirce saw for religion was
the influence of those who made certainty and
precision the hallmark of religious truth. Here
Peirce's "commonsensism" as he called it,
came to the fore. The truth found by apply-
ing the spirit of science to religion would not
necessarily be precise truth. Pierce thought; a
less precise understanding is often superior.
No concept, not even those of math-
ematics, is absolutely precise; and some
of the most important for everyday use
are extremely vague. Nevertheless, our
instinctive beliefs involving such
concepts are far more trustworthy than
the best established results of science, if
these be precisely understood.'^
A belief more open to metaphor and impreci-
sion resonates as genuinely true to experience
far more often than does rigid dogma, Peirce
argued.
He sought to renew religion through an
infusion of the open and truth-seeking spirit
of science, which would restore the importance
of religious experiences, rather than requiring
religion continually to reduce its claims to
authority in the face of skeptical and rational-
ist critiques. He detailed his vision in terms
of the "man whom religious experience most
devoutly moves":
While adhering to the essence of
religion, and so far as possible to the
church, which is all but essential, say,
penessential, to it, he will cast aside that
religious timidity that is forever
prompting the church to recoil from the
paths into which the Governor of history
is leading the minds of men, a coward-
ice that has stood through the ages as
the landmark and limit of her little faith,
and will gladly go forward, sure that
truth is not split into two warring
doctrines, and that any change that
knowledge can work in his faith can
only affect its expression, but not the
deep mystery expressed."^
This attitude would be "a religion of sci-
ence," meaning not, Peirce was clear, Chris-
tianity replaced by the worship of science, for
"religion, in the proper sense of the term, can
arise from nothing but the religious sensibil-
ity." Rather, it would be a religion so assured
of its own worth that "it becomes animated by
the scientific spirit, confident that all the con-
quests of science will be triumphs of its own."
'"^ Peirce's vision of scientific religion was one
in which neither reason nor experience domi-
nates, but both are brought together to create a
living belief. Certainty of religious belief
comes in the short term through experience,
but in the long term through the refinement of
that experience through continual communal
interpretation and evaluation.
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Fixing Belief through the Method
of Science
What were Peirce's grounds for laying so
much weight upon science and the scientific
method as the superior method for settling on
a true belief? Peirce's interest in belief and
how it came to be settled upon was central to
his philosophical and logical theory of prag-
matism, with its emphasis on the practical
results of ideas. '^ In his essay. "The Fixation
of Belief," Peirce described belief:
Our beliefs guide our desires and shape
our actions .... The feeling of believing
is a more or less sure indication of there
being established in our nature some
habit which will determine our
actions.'''
In contrast to belief, doubt does not es-
tablish a pattern of future action, but rather
incites the process of settling on a belief.
Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state
from which we struggle to free ourselves
and pass into the state of belief, while
the latter is a calm and satisfactory state
which we do not wish to avoid, or to
change to a belief in anything else.'"
To avoid settling for early certainty in the fix-
ing of religious belief, Peirce believed it might
be necessary to use the method of science to
push oneself to question continually, even
when other methods of , s
fixing belief might ap-
pear to have settled the
matter. Peirce knew
that it was tempting to
stay with beliefs
learned early in life (a
method he referred to
as "tenacity") or to
embrace those im-
posed upon a conmiu-
nity by authority, such
as the Church, or by a
priori philosophical
assumptions. However, Peirce noted that al-
though these methods may occasionally come
up with the correct belief, there is no guaran-
tee, linked as they are to the vagaries of hu-
man desires for certainty and seciuity.^' What
is needed truly to satisfy doubts is a method
that enables beliefs to be determined "by noth-
ing human, but by some external perma-
nency—by something upon which our think-
ing has no effect.... Such is the method of
science." ^^
The method of science provides a guard
against the human temptation to settle for
just any belief that appeared to assuage the
unease of doubt, by providing a structured
means of testing experience; and, therefore,
it was central to Peirce's logical approach to
the problem of the relation of religion and
science. Whereas his close friend William
James's psychological slant on belief
stressed the "unsharable feeling which each
one of us has of the pinch of his individual
destiny [as] the one thing that fills up the
measure of our concrete actuality," thus
making individual experience the essential
foundation of true ideas,^ Peirce combined
his support of the role of empirical experi-
ences in the fixation of belief with a convic-
tion of the necessity of a method for criti-
cally analyzing those experiences. The con-
cept of "abduction" was one of Pierce's key
innovations in his vision of the application
of the method of science to religion, and it
is the tie that binds science and religion to-
gether. Abduction for Peirce is distinct from
The truth found by applying the spirit of
science to religion would not necessarily
be precise truth, Pierce thought; a less
precise understanding is often superior,
A beliefmore open to metaphor and
imprecision resonates as genuinely true
to experiencefar more often than does
rigid dogma.
his conceptions of induction and deduction,
although he saw the three as coimected.-''
In his sixth "Lecture on Pragmatism," en-
titled "Three Types of Reasoning," given in
1903, Peirce defined the three modes of logi-
cal thought:
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Abduction is the process of forming an
explanatory hypothesis. It is the only
logical operation which introduces any
new idea; for induction does nothing
but determine a value, and deduction
merely evolves the necessary conse-
quences of a pure hypothesis. Deduc-
tion proves that something must be;
Induction shows that something
actually is operative; Abduction merely
suggests that something may beP
Abduction is able to suggest new ideas as
explanatory hypothesis:
[Abduction is a kind of] perceptual
judgment.... It is an act of insight
although of extremely fallible insight.
It is true that the different elements of
the hypothesis were in our minds
before; but it is the idea of putting
together what we had never before
dreamed of putting together which
flashes the new suggestion before our
contemplation.^^
A new experience triggers this abductive
flash of insight. Once the abductive explana-
tion has been produced based on the singular
experience, deduction and induction (Peirce
often equated the latter to the more general
idea of a "course of experimental investiga-
tion") are used to test the hypothesis.-^ Within
pragmatic logic, abduction brings forward
those hypotheses that might potentially
Peirce's callfor the openness ofscience
to new truth to he applied to religion and
his simultaneous assertion ofthe validity
ofhuman spiritual experience are two
sides ofthe same anti-dogmatic coin.
modify practical action, while eliminating
those that would have no distinctive effect on
conduct from consideration.^
Abduction, the Method of Science
and the Neglected Argument
In 1908, Peirce published an extended es-
say entitled "A Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God." In it, he described his theory
of how the direct experience of God that is the
root of individual religious belief intersects with
the method of science, specifically its abductive
aspect. Peirce began his essay with his idea of
"musement," a sort of meditation in which the
individual allows his or her mind to wonder
freely at the nature of the universe. Eventually,
according to Peirce, the interaction among the
various aspects of the universe would "inevita-
bly suggest the hypothesis of God's Reality." ^
Musement is. therefore, a form of abduction,
producing possible and plausible explanatory
hypotheses to explain unusual individual expe-
riences. Furthermore. Peirce was clear that the
scientific method is initially applied to the real-
ity of God in the same way that it is applied to
any object of thought. Knowledge of God is
not specifically to be sought. Any a priori as-
sumptions about what would be found or even
what was being looked for must be discarded
before beginning the process of generating
abductive hypotheses through musement.
One who sits down with the purpose of
becoming convinced of the truth of
religion is plainly not inquiring in
scientific singleness of heart, and must
always suspect himself of reasoning
unfairly.'"'
Yet the hypothesis of God is different from
other abductive hypotheses. Pierce thought,
for it is more than a theoretical idea for the
» muser. Whereas in gen-
P eral cases of abduction,' the hypothesis is sug-
gested inferentially from
a surprising experience
u and then tested, in the
I case of religious experi-
P ence the initial experi-
F ence that suggested the
k abductive hypothesis of
the existence of God is so persuasive that less
rigorous testing of the hypothesis is re-
quired—the hypothesis could be verified by
observing the practical transformation of the
life of the muser. Drawing on his earlier ideas
of 1893 that religion was not merely a belief,
but a living belief. Peirce described the hy-
pothesis of God generated by musement as
affecting the individual with a desire "above
all tilings to shape the whole conduct of life
and all springs of action into conformity" with
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it.^' The hypothesis of God is created through
the same method of science as all logical hy-
potheses for belief, but it is distinct in its trans-
forming effect on the muser.
However, even such transforming expe-
rience requires logical analysis to guard
against the natural human desire for security
and certainty. This logical analysis was to be
tailored in its level of precision to the object.
The hypothesis of God presents the muser
with an unusual object of hypothesis:
[l]t supposes an infinitely incomprehen-
sible object, although every hypothesis,
as such, supposes its object to be truly
conceived in the hypothesis. This
leaves the hypothesis but one way of
understanding itself; namely, as vague
yet as true so far as it is definite, and as
continually tending to define itself more
and more, and without limit.'-
The hypothesis of God, thus, could not to
be subject to the same kind of precise experi-
ments that other abductive explanations could,
but Peirce still believed it could be critically
analyzed. His solution was his theory of prag-
matism, or pragmaticism as he was calling it
by this point. Praginaticism was Peirce' s flex-
ible method of testing ideas of varying preci-
sion and levels of definition. The trained man
of science, Peirce said, would test the hypoth-
esis of God:
...taking his stand upon Pragmaticism,
which implies faith in common sense
and in instinct, though only as they
issue from the cupelfumace of
measured criticism. In short, he will
say that the N. A. [neglected argument]
is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry,
resulting in a hypothesis of the very
highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test
must lie in its value in the self-
controlled growth of man's conduct of
life.^^
The hypothesis of the reality of God con-
forms to the early stages of scientific inquiry,
but given that it cannot be fully compre-
hended by the individual, and thus cannot be
subject to definite deductive and inductive
tests, its usefulness and value can only be
determined by its transforming effects on the
individual's way of living. Peirce had re-
turned once again to "the sole principle of
logic which was recommended by Jesus: "Ye
may know them by their fruits," thus mak-
ing abduction "intimately allied with the
ideas of the gospel.^"* Applying the method
of science to religion made it evident that it
was how one lived, not creeds and dogmas
ascribed to, that was the hallmark of religious
belief.
Conclusion
Charles Sanders Peirce presents a vision
of the integration of religious experience with
scientific reason unlike any other offered by
his nineteenth-century contemporaries; and
even today, his logical approach to the prob-
lem of the relations between science and faith
is unique among the varied ideas that form
the debate. Rather than casting religion as
the fossil of an earlier stage of humanity's
moral development, as Andrew Dickson
White did, or considering it as an aspect of
individual psychology and, thus, wholly sepa-
rate from the work of science, Peirce's em-
phasis on how belief is formed enabled him
to envision a relationship in which religion
and science were equal and integrated part-
ners. His stress on the interplay of experi-
ence and reason as both valid and necessary
elements of the pursuit of truth enabled him
to overcome the trap of equating truth with
certainty and "anything goes" relativism.
Peirce saw his vision of "scientific religion"
as maintaining the integrity of both reUgion
and science, while allowing them to be
brought together. As he described in "The
Marriage of Religion and Science":
It is a religion, so true to itself, that it
becomes animated by the scientific
spirit, confident that all the conquests of
science will be triumphs of its own, and
accepting all the results of science, as
scientific men themselves accept them,
as steps towards the truth, which may
appear for a time to be in conflict with
other truths, but which in such cases
merely await adjustments which time is
sure to effect. This attitude, be it
observed, is one which religion will
assume not at the dictate of science, still
less by way of a compromise, but
simply and solely out of a bolder
confidence in herself and in her own
destiny.^^
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Peirce's call for the openness of science
to new truth to be applied to religion and his
simultaneous assertion of the validity of hu-
man spiritual experience are two sides of the
same anti-dogmatic coin. Both aspects of his
"scientific religion" guard against the lure of
settling for certainty, and each serves as a
check on the dominance of the other. In the
long term, it is this relinquishment of certainty
in favor of the pursuit of truth that will in-
vigorate both science and religion. In his 1878
essay, "The Fixation of Belief," Pierce noted:
All those [systems] which repose
heavily upon an "inconceivability of the
opposite" have proved particularly
fragile and short lived. Those,
however, which rest upon positive
evidences, and which avoid insisting
upon the absolute precision of their
dogmas are hard to destroy.^*"
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4. One example of Peirce's social indiscre-
tion was his very public affair and cohabita-
tion with his second wife prior to both his di-
vorce from his first wife and his remarriage.
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mysterious background, including an unsub-
stantiated claim that she was a Hapsburg prin-
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Science," para. 428. (Citations from this se-
ries give the paragraph number, the conven-
tion for this edition of Pierce s collected pa-
pers.)
9. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear,"
para., footnote 2.
10. Peirce, "The Marriage of Religion and
Science," para. 432.
11. White, p. 23. Although White's title
indicates that his was directed to theology,
lines such as the ones quoted here which ap-
pear throughout the book suggest that White
envisioned science as replacing more than
simply theology.
12. Peirce, "What is Christian Faith?" para.
439.
13. Ibid., para. 436.
14. John Draper, a contemporary ofAndrew
Dickson White and Charles Peirce, received
much attention for his book. History of the
Conflict between Religion and Science ( 1874).
Draper saw the conflict between riligion and
science as resulting from an inevitable clash
between the two. Unlike Peirce and White,
who both, to varying degrees, saw essential
elements of religion as compatible with sci-
ence. Draper saw all facets of religion as in-
hibiting the progress of science.
15. Peirce, "Answers to Questions Concern-
ing My Belief in God," para. 496.
16. Peirce, "The Marriage of Religion and
Science," para. 432.
17. Ibid., para. 433.
18. Peirce renamed the theory pragmati-
cism— a term he deemed too ugly to be "kid-
napped"— in the later years of his life to dis-
tinguish his version of the doctrine from that
of otherAmerican philosophers who had taken
up his ideas. Menand, pp. 350-51; Smith, p.
6.
19. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," para.
371.
20. Ibid., para. 372.
21. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," para.
378, 379, 383.
22. Ibid., para. 384.
23. James, para. 499.
The Boston Theological Institute 163
24. See Goudge, pp. 195-99, for a discus-
sion of how Peirce over time came to see in-
duction and abduction as two points on the
spectrum of ampliative (amplifying, rather
than explaining) inference, and the connec-
tion of the two with deduction.
25. Peirce, "Three Types of Reasoning,"
para. 171.
26. Peirce, "Pragmatism and Abduction,"
para. 181.
27. Peirce, "Three Types of Reasoning,"
para. 168.
28. Peirce, "Pragmatism and Abduction,"
para. 196.
29. Peirce, "The Marriage of Religion and
Science," para. 465.
30. Ibid., para. 458.
31. Ibid., para. 467.
32. Ibid., para. 466.
33. Ibid., para. 480.
34. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear,"
para. 402, footnote 1 (1893). John E. Smith
points out that here Peirce might be drawing
on an idea prominent in seventeenth and eigh-
teenth century American Calvinist Puritanism,
that any individual might deceive themselves
and others of their beliefs, and so real out-
ward evidence of transformation was a nec-
essary corollary of professed belief. See
Smith, p. 18.
35. Peirce, "The Marriage of Religion and
Science," para. 433.
36. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," para.
376.
Elizabeth Patton is a native of Harvard, Massaciiusetts. Stie received her undergraduate
degree in the Comparative Study of Religion and the History of Science from Harvard
University in 2000, and received her l\/laster of Philosophy degree in Theology at the
University of Cambridge in 2001.
<ewpatton @hotmail.com>
164 The Journal ofFaith and Science Exchange, 2001
